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Abstract The Author tackles the RoA thesis, and opposes to it the ‘Weakness 
of Authoritarianism’ (WoA) argument. According to the latter, the 
authoritarian regimes are politically poorly institutionalized, as 
it is proved by their incapacity to transmit the political power pe-
acefully and smoothly. Therefore, the authoritarian regimes are 
by definition on the verge of breakdown, they are constitutively 
weak and they can only precariously survive only as long as some 
regime factors (a political party, a bureaucracy penetrated by the 
dominant elite, a loyal and efficient coercive apparatus) mana-
ge to stem social and political mobilization against the power 
incumbents. The institutionalization of the coercive apparatus 
should not be considered in itself, but together with other aspects 
of the political institutionalization of a given regime. Some evi-
dence is drawn from the recent cases of regime breakdown in the 
Middle East and North Africa.
Keywords Authoritarianism, Political Institutionalization, Regime 
Breakdown, Middle East and North Africa
Sintesi L’Autore prende in considerazione la tesi della “robustezza 
dell’autoritarismo” (RoA), avanzando l’argomento opposto della 
“debolezza dell’autoritarismo” (WoA). In base a questo argomen-
to, i regimi autoritari risultano deboli a causa della loro bassa 
istituzionalizzazione, come mostrato dalla loro incapacità di 
trasmettere il potere pacificamente e regolarmente. I regimi au-
toritari sono, quindi, per definizione prossimi al crollo e deboli. 
La loro sopravvivenza può essere assicurata da alcuni fattori del 
regime (un partito politico, una burocrazia penetrata da una eli-
te dominante, un apparato di coercizione leale ed efficiente) che 
riescano a canalizzare la mobilitazione politica contro i detentori 
del potere. L’istituzionalizzazione dell’apparato di coercizione, 
pertanto, dovrebbe essere considerato in congiunzione con altri 
aspetti dell’istituzionalizzazione politica di un dato regime. Al-
cune evidenze sono tratte dai recenti casi si crollo di regime nel 
Medio oriente e nel Nord Africa.
Parole chiave Autoritarismo, Istituzionalizzazione politica, Crollo di 
regime, Medio oriente e Nord Africa
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1. Introduction
Some years ago, an influential article by Eva Bellin1 advanced a challenging per-
spective with regard to the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) countries and the relative resistance against democra-
tization by the regimes of that geographical area. Bellin argued that although the 
MENA countries lacked the prerequisites of democratization (a strong civil soci-
ety, a market driven economy, adequate income and literacy levels, democratic 
neighbors, and democratic culture), none of the explanations of the region’s fail-
ure to democratize based on the theory of the prerequisites of democracy would 
be satisfying. Rather than searching for the causes which inhibited democracy 
in its prerequisites or preconditions, Bellin suggested to move the focus on the 
capacity of the authoritarian states in the MENA region to overcome the mass 
disaffection from the regime in power. Following Theda Skocpol,2 who explained 
the relatively rare revolutionary events in contemporary world with the state’s 
capacity to resort to the means of coercion and to maintain the monopoly over 
them, Bellin stated that “the solution to the puzzle of Middle Eastern and North 
African exceptionalism lies less in absent prerequisites of democratization and 
more in present conditions that foster robust authoritarianism, specifically a ro-
bust coercive apparatus in these states. The will and capacity of the state’s coer-
cive apparatus to suppress democratic initiative have extinguished the possibil-
ity of transition”.3
There would be at least four crucial variables in shaping the robustness of a 
regime’s coercive apparatus: fiscal health; the maintenance of international sup-
port networks; the level of institutionalization of the coercive apparatus itself, 
which is inversely related to its will to repress reform initiatives;4 and finally the 
level of popular mobilization. The last two factors revealed recently to be decisive 
in the management of the political crises generated by the uprising of the popu-
lation in the MENA countries, namely Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria. Facing a 
very high level of popular mobilization, the poorly institutionalized (and hence 
patrimonially organized) coercive apparatuses of Libya and Syria’s regimes re-
acted repressing the reform initiatives and driving the two countries in a blood-
bath, whilst the highly institutionalized coercive apparatuses of Tunisia and 
Egypt found out an accommodation with the reformers and eventually support-
ed them in the transition and the pacific channeling of the popular mobilization. 
Indeed, “where the coercive apparatus is institutionalized, the security elite has 
1 Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East. Exceptionalism in 
Comparative Perspective”, Comparative Politics, 36 (January 2004), 139-157.
2 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
3 Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism”, p. 143.
4 “The more institutionalized the security establishment is, the more willing it will be to 
disengage from power and allow political reform to proceed. The less institutionalized it is, the 
less amenable it will be to reform”. Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism”, p. 145.
6a sense of corporate identity separate from the state”, and “it is distinguished by 
a commitment to some broader national mission that serves the public good”.5 
In conclusion, the Arab Spring shows evidence that: “If the coercive apparatus is 
patrimonially organized rather than institutionalized, it is likely to be less recep-
tive to the idea of change because it is more likely to be ‘ruined by reform’”.6
Although Bellin’s interpretation could be scarcely said to be incoherent and 
drives our attention to the central ‘fact’ of politics, which is the intimate link be-
tween political action and the potential resort to the means of coercion by the 
actors involved in it, it is nevertheless arguable. Firstly, the institutionalization 
of the coercive apparatus does not progress on its own and separately from oth-
er aspects of political institutionalization, among which those inherently con-
nected to the basic compounds of any political regime according to David Easton: 
structure of authority, rules and procedures, values.7 The patterns assumed by 
the civil-military relations in the various regimes and the will and capacity of 
the military to intervene in politics depend on the level of institutionalization of 
their structures of authority, rules and values. From this point of view, it is ques-
tionable whether the authoritarian regimes can be said to be at all able to acquire 
over time a sufficient degree of political institutionalization. Normally, as it will 
be stressed later, in any authoritarian regime the structure of authority is badly 
defined and subject to the conditioning of various intervening factors, such as 
the role of a dominant party or of the dominant elite. Moreover, the limit of the 
power exercised by the leadership is scarcely foreseeable and subject to any sort 
of infringement by the member of the leadership. Rules and procedures can be 
easily manipulated by the dominant elite and twisted to please its own interest 
or occasional convenience. Nor it could be said that in the authoritarian regimes 
a generalized compliance to a set of shared values is usually to be observed. This 
is why the dominant elite repress sometime brutally any non-authorized expres-
sion of social and cultural identity, which menaces the legitimacy of the regime 
and is perceived as a threat to its identity. In Huntington’s term, we could con-
clude that the political institutions of any authoritarian, namely its structure of 
authority, rules and procedures, and its basic values, are not generally perceived 
as valid and stable.8
Secondly, and more pragmatically, it is rather a striking contrast the one pic-
tured by the thesis of the ‘Robustness of Authoritarianism’ (RoA), that of regimes 
whose survival and stability lay in the capacity to threaten its citizens even to the 
point of murdering them when necessary. To the Chinese dictator Mao Zedong 
5 Ibid., pp. 145-146.
6 Eva Bellin, “Reconsidering the ROA in the Middle East”, Comparative Politics, 44 (January 
2012), p. 129.
7 David Easton, A framework for political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965).
8 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1968).
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who used to say “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun”9, one could an-
swer using the words attributed to Talleyrand and often used by Napoleon: “On 
peut tout faire avec des baïonnettes sauf s’asseoir dessus”. The survival and stability 
of any political regime are affected by its capacity to generate among its citizens 
support and compliance, which have to be to a certain extension genuine and 
willing, and can not be extorted point black. A well established tradition of politi-
cal theory, streaming from Max Weber to Talcott Parsons, bolstered the opinion 
that a clear indication of power failure is the need to recur to violence. It is at the 
same time a clear indication of state failure.
The arguments advanced in the following sections can be summarized as fol-
lows. The institutionalization of the coercive apparatus (or its professionaliza-
tion, the two processes being parts of the same phenomenon, as it will be argued) 
is a consequence of the differentiation of the state political functions, in other 
words the institutionalization of the coercive apparatus is a dependent variable 
of the political institutionalization of a given regime. The authoritarian regimes 
are generally speaking poorly institutionalized in comparison with the democra-
cy, as it is proved by their incapacity of guaranteeing both the power incumbents 
and the power challengers. Therefore, the authoritarian regimes are by defini-
tion on the verge of breakdown, they are constitutively weak and they can only 
precariously survive as long as some regime factors (a political party, a bureaucracy 
penetrated by the dominant elite, a loyal and efficient coercive apparatus) man-
age to stem social and political mobilization against the power incumbents.
2. Some Preliminary Remarks on the Civil-Military Relations
Bellin claimed that her notion of “institutionalization of the coercive apparatus 
should not be confused with professionalization in Huntington’s sense”, but 
rather associated to Max Weber’s concept of bureaucracy and its related qualities. 
Indeed, “institutionalization does not refer to the depoliticization of the security 
establishment and its subordination to civilian control”.10 Nonetheless, Bellin’s 
distinction between professionalization and institutionalization introduces few 
ambiguities and rests on some arguable interpretation of Huntington’s thesis. 
Firstly, Huntington argued that the professionalization of the military is a com-
bined effect of the process of differentiation and modernization of the society.11 
The development of the professional military corps implied the introducing of 
educational requirement for entry the officer corps, a system of advancement 
9 Quoted by Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics. Military Coups and Governments (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977).
10 Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism”, p. 145.
11 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957).  
8based on experience, ability and achievements, the creation of military acade-
mies for fostering the military education, and the introduction of the staff sys-
tem to support the military leadership in logistics and management of the activi-
ties in peace and war. This equals to say that a professional military corps has to 
be at the same time to a certain extension a bureaucratic corps and hence profes-
sionalization and institutionalization, i.e. bureaucratic organization, coincide or 
are two overlapping phenomena. Both the effects of institutionalization over the 
political life pointed out by Bellin coincide with the effects of professionalization 
according to Huntington: the development of “a sense of corporate identity sepa-
rate from the state”, and of “a commitment to some broader national mission 
that serves the public good”.12 Secondly, it is true that Huntington conjectured 
that professionalism of the military, which is a high degree of differentiation 
of the military institutions from other social institutions, is the condition for 
achieving a high degree of civilian control over the means or coercion, but con-
versely he stated that “the principal causes of military intervention in politics lie 
in politics, not in the military”, and “even with a professionalized military estab-
lishment, however, military intervention may occur when the political institu-
tions of society become weak and divided”.13 Therefore, the true question is: Why 
are the political institutions weak and divided? In Huntington’s perspective the 
depoliticization of the security establishment and its subordination to civilian 
control are only conditional and depend on some political variables, namely the 
strength of the political institutions and their capacity to fulfill some essential 
functions of guarantee. The investigation of such functions is hence a prelimi-
nary task to be accomplished.
3. Democracy and Non-democracy
It will be avoided here to enter the everlasting controversy over the definition 
of authoritarianism and the subsequent debate over the classification of the au-
thoritarian regimes.14 As a shortcut in this tangled issue, it will be here stipulated 
12 Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism”, pp. 145-146. Compare Bellin’s perspective 
with Huntington’s: “A professional officer corps […] is jealous of its own limited sphere of com-
petence but recognizes its incompetence in matters that lie outside the professional military 
sphere and hence is willing to accept its role as a subordinate instrument of the state”. Samuel 
P. Huntington, “Civil-Military Relations”, in David L. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the 
Social Sciences (New York: The Mcmillan Company & The Free Press, 1968), p. 493.
13 Ibidem.
14 The beginning of the debate dates back to Juan J. Linz, “An Authoritarian Regime: the Case 
of Spain”, in E. Allardt e Y. Littunen (eds.), Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems, (Helsinki: Wes-
termarck Society, 1964), 291-342. See among the most recent contributions on this topic Farid 
Guliyev (2011), “Personal Rule, Neopatrimonialism, and Regime Typologies: Integrating Dahl-
ian and Weberian Approaches to Regime Studies”, Democratization, 3 (18, 2011), 575-601. The 
issue has become even more puzzling since the introduction of an intermediate category be-
tween democracy and authoritarianism, such as ‘hybrid regimes’. See L. Morlino, “Are there Hy-
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that a sufficient and necessary characteristic of any democracy is political plural-
ism, from which open political competition derives and which makes political 
participation effective.15 Therefore, the more a political regime departs from this 
basic characteristic the more it is approaching the authoritarian ideal-type,16 and 
from this perspective the authoritarian regimes may all be labeled as ‘non-de-
mocracy’, regardless to their specificities.
Political pluralism, as it manifested through genuine competition and par-
ticipation, may determine in democracy the turnover of the political leadership, 
making it accountable, while participation and the distribution of political sup-
port generate some degree of responsiveness of the political leadership to the 
popular demands, and hence a democracy can be defined as a regime based on the 
institutionalization of the political accountability.17 The institutionalization of the 
political accountability, a typical and exclusive quality of the democracy, trans-
forms drastically the exercise of power, which in democracy is mainly possible 
through the temporary control of some given roles of authority. Certain estab-
lished norms and procedural resources are associated to the roles of authority 
in such a way to make the range of the political power foreseeable. Hence in de-
mocracy the exercise of power is limited within a predetermined range, the term 
in power and the procedures for the change over of the power incumbents are 
clearly established and it is possible to get rid of the power incumbents with-
out bloodshed. On the opposite, the ‘non democracies’ are constitutively weak, 
because of their very low level of political institutionalization, which enhances 
to an unbearable level the costs involved in the transmission of the power and 
blocks the political process favoring some privileged groups at the expense of 
others.
On these bases, it should appear as evident that normally a democracy en-
joys a relatively high degree of institutionalization of the political accountability, 
while it results very low or totally absent in the authoritarian regimes.18 In the 
brid Regimes? Or are They just an Optical Illusion?”, European Political Science Review, 1 (2, 2009), 
273-296, and Matthijs Bogaards, “How to Classify Hybrid Regimes? Defective Democracy and 
Electoral Authoritarianism”, Democratization, 16 (2, 2009), 399-423.
15 For an extension of this argument, see Giuseppe Ieraci and Angelo Paulon, “Measures of 
Freedom, Democracy and the ‘Freedom in the World’ Index”, Quaderni di Scienza Politica, 17 (2, 
2010), 389-413, particularly pp. 391-393.
16 Oliver Schlumberger, “The political economy of state-formation in the Arab Middle East: 
Rentier states, economic reform, and democratization”, Review of International Political Econo-
my, 15 (4, 2000), 599-621, remarked that the liberalization of an authoritarian regime does not 
imply necessarily its democratization through the establishment of democratic institutions 
which guarantee political competition and participation. 
17 Giuseppe Ieraci, Teoria dei governi e democrazia. Ruoli, risorse e arene istituzionali (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 2003), p. 26.
18 The following argument is derived from Giuseppe Ieraci, “Il crollo dei regimi non demo-
cratici. Stabilità politica e crisi di regime in Tunisia, Libia ed Egitto”, Rivista Italiana di Scienza 
politica, 43 (1, 2013).
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latter, as already implicitly stated, the power capacity associated to the leader-
ship (raís, lider maximo, caudillo, ‘Council of the Revolution’, President, King or 
however it may be identifiable) is not so well limited by the use of established 
norms and procedural resources. While the power is easily transferable in de-
mocracy because its range is limited and foreseeable, it is less easily transferable 
in the authoritarian regimes because the costs involved in such a transmission 
are not foreseeable. What will happen to the former incumbents? What will the 
new incumbents do with the former regime’s structure and apparatuses? In de-
mocracy the transmission of power is a matter of time and it is pacific, with no 
consequences for the ones who are defeated. In any authoritarian regimes there 
is no timing for the transmission of power, and who is defeated in the struggle 
for power risks now everything, even his own life. Differently stated, in democ-
racy the power does not belong to the incumbents, but it is rather abstractly at-
tached to some institutionalized roles of authorities with formal and procedural 
attributions. In the authoritarian regimes, on the opposite, the power becomes a 
‘personal reserve’ of the incumbents because the roles from which it is exercised 
are not formally defined. Moreover, in democracy power and relative capacities 
tend to become public, because they ‘belong’ to the formally defined ‘office’, not 
to the temporary incumbent. In the authoritarian regimes they tend instead to 
become private, because their limit and use are discretionary.
In democracy it is relatively easy and costless to get rid of the actual power 
incumbents, because the capacities attached to the institutionalized roles are 
not affected by the future power transmission, these capacities are autonomous 
from the individuals who have been using them since they got in office. In other 
words, in democracy the likelihood of the transmission of power is high and costless 
because the range and the effectiveness of the political power are foreseeable. On 
the opposite, in any ‘non-democracy’ the degree of institutionalization is low and 
to get rid of the power incumbents may result costly, the likelihood of the trans-
mission of power is very low, because by removing the actual power incumbents 
the bases of the power themselves are destabilized. In any ‘non-democracy’, 
power and capacities are not fully associated with formal roles and established 
norms and procedures, therefore they can not be easily regenerated when the 
power incumbents are removed. Power and capacities are not autonomous from 
their holders. This is way to transmit the power is always such a conflict issue in a 
‘non-democracy’, very often leading to a bloody redde rationem between the power 
holders and their challengers.
In any political regime the likelihood of the transmission of power is linked 
to another general property, namely the nature of the relation between political 
elites and social classes, which can be based on an integration pattern or on coopta-
tion. Integration prevails in democracy, where the power acquired by the political 
elites and their organizations depends directly on the support gained in the elec-
toral competition and maintained once in office. In search for popular support 
and for the support of the social groups, the elites offer political outputs but the 
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exchange established with the voters and the social groups reveals to be instable 
or flexible. Indeed, because the exchanged values may vary over time, the social 
groups have an incentive in offering their support to different fractions of the po-
litical elites, favouring their alternation in power, while the elites have an interest 
in enlarging as much as possible their support to maintain or enhance their actual 
power position. As a consequence, the ratio of the exchange between elites and 
social groups is always negotiable and open to various solutions. This pattern of 
relation fosters the integration between the political elites through the mecha-
nism of the electoral competition and the channels of the political representation 
(parliament and political parties). Integration means the prevalence of shared 
patterns of behaviour and values, such as the recognition of the national parlia-
ment as the legitimate channel of representation and the electoral competition 
as a mechanism of selection of the government. The exchange of political outputs 
for support between elites and social groups is institutionalized.
Cooptation of the social groups by a dominant political elite is the recurrent 
pattern among the ‘non-democracies’. The political elite enjoys a ‘monopoly’ over 
the power and its position is not immediately challengeable. The necessary sup-
port to the elite in power is provided by some privileged groups with which ex-
clusive and direct links are established, even through patronage and clientelism. 
Sometimes a political party, whose organization is deeply ramified in the society, 
may guarantee these links, offering to the faithful social groups opportunities 
of promotion and achievement in the state bureaucracy and apparatuses, in the 
military corps and police. In some cases the party may even perform basic social 
functions, providing through its organizational ramification social protection, 
health care, revenue, family assistance, education and formation. The perfor-
mance of these social functions may be a mean to distribute privileges and re-
wards to the supporting social groups, or it may be a way of making up for state 
decline and failure. Through the supply of these privileges and rewards the po-
litical elite binds some loyal social groups and excludes the others, and the more 
the access to the political power is occluded the more the political elite and the 
loyal social groups will reinforce they bond. The striking difference of the ‘non-
democracies’ in comparison with the functioning of the democratic process is 
that the relation between political elite and social groups is not characterized by 
negotiation and flexible exchange, and that there is no institutionalization of 
channels which favour the trade offs between political outputs and support be-
tween. As a consequence, only some privileged groups are co-opted by the domi-
nant elite while some others are marginalized and even repressed. Cooptation as 
a practice of government generates sub-cultural identifications (of ideological, 
ethnic and linguistic, religious, and tribal type) which the social groups may de-
velop and use in opposing each other. 
This is a way of finding an answer to the question why the political structures 
of the ‘non-democracy’ are weak and divided, which was asked at the end of the 
previous section. They are weak because affected by a null or very low level of insti-
12
tutionalization in roles of authority to which formal attributions and procedures 
are attached to make the handing of power from one incumbent to the next 
smooth and costless. They are divided because they do not integrate all the social 
groups in the democratic process, but rather co-opt some of them, distributing 
to them rewards and privileges, and marginalize some other. The former groups, 
which offer support to the dominant elite and receive benefits from it, are will-
ing to recognize the members of the elite as ‘idols’ to respect, defend in conflict 
and even to worship. The marginalized groups, on the opposite, hate those ‘idols’ 
and their supporters. The exclusion from the distribution or benefit and rewards 
exacerbate their frustration and foster the desire for revenge. The ‘non-democra-
cies’ are by definition poorly institutionalized regimes and they may survive in 
a perilous balance which preludes sooner or later to the outburst of conflict and 
breakdown. The ‘non-democracies’ are never robust; they are rather weak and 
their ‘idols’ are prone to fall.
4. Institutionalization and Political Stability 
Democracy as a regime which institutionalizes the political accountability exhib-
its a relatively high capacity of guaranteeing both the power incumbents and the 
power challengers. This bilateral guarantee is provided by established rules for 
the transmission of power and by its fixed term and range of action. The weak-
ness of the authoritarian regimes lies hence in their limited level of political in-
stitutionalization, which exposes the oppositions to the risk of being repressed 
by the unconstrained power holders, and eventually makes the transmission 
of power a rough matter with extremely high risks involved for both the actual 
power incumbents and their challengers. Huntington’s celebrated definition ac-
cording to which “institutionalization is the process by which organizations and 
procedures acquire value and stability”19 is very general and does not direct the 
attention to the functions fulfilled by the political institutions and to their differ-
ent capacities to perform them effectively in various contexts. Briefly stated, the 
political functions of an institution could be grouped as: 
– Attribution of roles: defining the roles of authority, their term, and the proce-
dures for the turnover of the incumbents; 
– Allocation of resources: defining the admitted range of action of each role on the 
base of some procedural resources attached to them;
– Patterning of relations: shaping ‘arenas of the institutional confrontation’ 
among the given roles;20 
19 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12.
20 See Giuseppe Ieraci, Teoria dei governi e democrazia. Ruoli, risorse e arene istituzionali (Bologna: 
Il Mulino, 2003).
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These three basic functions are clearly distinctive qualities of any democratic 
institutional framework, though the relative level of institutionalization may 
vary according to the cases and their development stage. It is thanks to them that 
the power transmission in democracy, when compared with the ‘non-democracies’, 
is smoothed down through the fixing of the terms for each role and the establish-
ment of the procedures for the turn over of the incumbents. One of the main 
consequences of this institutional functioning is making the resources attached 
to the roles of authority relatively autonomous from the individuals who are cur-
rently occupying them. 
The political institutions of a given regime, conceived as organizations and 
procedures, may acquire value and stability as long as they perform those three 
political functions, because they guarantee the two sides involved in the strug-
gle for power, the actual incumbents and their challengers. ‘Adaptability-Rigidity’, 
‘Complexity-Simplicity’, ‘Autonomy-Subordination’, ‘Coherence-Disunity’21 are 
more organizational criteria than direct indicators of true political institutionali-
zation. An organization might as well be extremely developed in terms of ‘Adapt-
ability’, ‘Complexity’, ‘Autonomy’, and ‘Coherence’, and yet offering very precari-
ous answers to the basic issues of the allocation of the power resources and the 
transmission of power. If the dichotomy ‘democracy versus non-democracy’ was 
represented as a series of continuous variables along the three functions above 
listed, there would result a constant polarized distribution of the cases extracted 
to identify the two regimes. In democracy, the distribution of the roles is fixed 
and horizontal, the allocation of the resources is stable and known ex-ante, the 
political confrontation takes place into highly formalized institutional arenas. 
These properties make the transmission of the power through open competition 
sustainable. On the opposite, in a ‘non-democracy’ the distribution of the roles is 
discretional and hierarchical, the allocation of the resources is variable, and either 
there are no formally defined arenas of the institutional confrontations among 
the roles, or they are badly defined. As a consequence the power transmission can 
not be open and it rather takes place through mechanisms of closed co-optation.
In no way such a constitutive weakness of the ‘non-democracies’, i.e. authori-
tarian regimes, implies a future and unavoidable win for democracy. As many 
studies proved, the authoritarian regimes are able to survive for decades and 
their dominant elites manage quite often to ensure the continuity of the regime 
through the mechanism of political cooptation. Nonetheless the authoritarian 
regimes face recurrent crises, outbursts of violent rebellion, and are permanently 
on the verge of breakdown. Their capacity to repress the opposition is undoubt-
edly one of the key factors of their survival, but it should not be mistaken for a 
sign of stability or strength. Mao Zedong’s quotation before recalled was comple-
mentary to another renowned one: “Our Principle is that the Party commands 
the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party”. A regime 
21 Huntington, Political Order, pp. 13-24.
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which uses the guns to manage the conflict and force the ‘solution’ of a problem 
has failed, though the use of the means of coercion may not bring about its fall as 
a necessary consequence.
What are then the general conditions of political stability, or rather survival, 
of any ‘non democracy’? An answer to this question could be drawn from the de-
bate on the conditions of the democratic stability, where three general interpreta-
tions have become influential. The approach based on the characteristics of the 
‘political culture’, inaugurated by Almond and Verba over fifty years ago,22 has 
underlined the correlation between stability and the dominant political values. 
Where ‘subject’ or ‘parochial’ values prevail, sub-cultural identities and anti-loyal 
attitudes are likely to develop with regard to the political system. On these bases, 
a first hypothesis could be advanced:
Hp 1: The political regimes featured by low political institutionalization, therefore by 
high costs of the transmission of the power and by the block of the political process, favor 
the establishment of sub-cultural identities and loyalties, which in turn erode the consen-
sus base the regimes and create the conditions for social conflict and rebellion.
A second influential approach might be generally labeled as ‘socio-centered’ 
and it offers a complementary perspective to the cultural approach. According 
to Dahl, the conditions of the success of the poliarchy are the dispersion of the 
socio-economic resources and the neutralization of the coercive ones.23 Harry 
Eckstein stated something similar when he posed that a cohesive democracy en-
joys a considerable degree of congruence between the governmental and societal 
patterns of authority24. For both, the stability of a democracy is guaranteed when 
its political system reflects quite faithfully the harmonic distribution of equali-
ties and inequalities to be found in society. Therefore:
Hp 2: The political regimes featured by low political institutionalization, that is by high 
costs of the transmission of the power and by the block of the political process, favor the 
exclusion of some groups and the concentration of the socio-economic resources in the 
hands of some other, which in turn determine a contraposition among the groups and 
create the conditions for social conflict and rebellion.
Finally, there is the institutional approach inaugurated by Huntington, which has 
already been recalled. Huntington argued that the recurrent crisis of participa-
tion and mobilization in changing and developing societies can be surmounted 
22 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1963). 
23 See Robert A. Dahl, Poliarchy. Participation and Opposition in Democracy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1971).
24 See Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy. A Study of Norway (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1966).
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by their political institutions, among which political parties play an outstanding 
role.25 Thus extending Huntington’s argument to the ‘non democracies’, it could 
be inferred that they can survive, although only precariously, as long as some 
regime organizations manage to channel mass participation in politics. Such 
regime organizations may be a political party, a bureaucracy penetrated by the 
dominant elite, or a loyal and efficient coercive apparatus, which manage to stem 
social and political mobilization against the power incumbents. Nonetheless, 
and contrary to Huntington, it is important to stress that in the perspective here 
advanced such regime organizations are not truly institutional. A political party, 
and even the state bureaucracy and the military corps can be deeply ‘colonized’ by 
the dominant elite who will use them as structures of opportunity to distributes 
offices and privileges to the members of the groups supporting the regime. Such 
regime organizations do not fulfill any of the three political functions above de-
tected, and they do not promote either fair mechanism for the open transmis-
sion of power or a flowing process of trade-off between power incumbents and 
social groups. Simply stated, these organizations tend to be non-institutional or 
pre-institutional and having failed to recognize their true nature is one of the 
major pitfalls of Huntington’s ‘institutionalism’. They are non-institutional in 
their properties because they do not provide generalized guarantees for both 
sides involved in the struggle for power (incumbents and challengers), but they 
are quite effective as instruments of control of conflict and popular mobilization 
through coercion and manipulation:
Hp 3: The political regimes featured by low political institutionalization, therefore by 
high costs of the transmission of the power and by the block of the political process, con-
trol the access to the socio-economic and political resources and reduce the conflict by 
means of non-institutional regime organizations, thus the decay of these organizations 
creates the conditions for the breakdown of the regime.
The three hypotheses can be combined together because they identify two com-
plementary interpretative lines on the breakdown of the ‘non democracies’. Hp 
1 and Hp 2 focus on some ‘social factors’ capable of enfeebling the authoritarian 
regimes, such as the loss of legitimacy or a deep transformation in the values 
and culture orientations of the population. These changes are often combined 
with or they might trigger some process of redistribution of the circulating so-
cio-economic resources, which might help the emergence and the progress of 
some of the marginalized groups. Hp 3 points out some of the internal ‘regime 
25 ‘The modern, developed polity differs from the traditional, developed polity in the nature of 
its institutions. The institutions of the traditional polity need only structure the participation of 
a small segment of society. The institutions of a modern polity must organize the participation 
of the mass of the population. The crucial institutional distinction between the two is thus in 
the organizations for structuring mass participation in politics. The distinctive institution of the 
modern polity, consequently, is the political party’. Huntington, Political Order, p. 89 (Italics added).
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factors’ (political parties, state bureaucracies and apparatuses, military corps, 
regime militias) which explain how such lowly institutionalized regimes as 
the ‘non democracies’ may extend their capacity of exercising social and politi-
cal control over the population and the oppositions. Nonetheless the propensity 
of the ‘non democracies’ to survive and their duration in the short and medium 
run, thanks to the ‘regime factors’, should not be mistaken for a sign of political 
stability. When eventually the regime organizations weaken, because the links 
between the organizations themselves and the supporting social groups loosen, 
or because new cycles of social mobilization have been triggered, the ‘non de-
mocracies’ waver and sometimes fall down unexpectedly with a crash.
5. A Theoretical Model and Its Attempted Application
The theoretical connections among the three sets of variables in the general hy-
potheses previously outlined are sketched in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1: De-institutionalization and revolutionary breakdown in the ‘non democracies’. A 
Theoretical Model
Source: Ieraci, ‘Il crollo dei regimi non democratici’.
The major weakness of the ‘non democracies’ lies in their extremely low level of 
institutionalization, as it is revealed by their incapacity to assure the peaceful 
transmission of the power and to promote a sufficiently elastic political process. 
The struggle for the political power is not open and the political process fur-
thers the interests of some privileged groups at the expense of others. The ‘non 
democracies’ may survive even facing loss of legitimacy and growing social in-
equalities, as long as the supporting social groups stay loyal, the regime is able to 
co-opt new supporters, and above all the regime organizations carry on perform-
ing effectively their control and channeling of the popular mobilization. In the 
hypothetical model of Fig. 1, the two key ‘social factors’ impact negatively on the 
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precarious level of institutionalization of the regime. Indeed, fall in the belief of 
the legitimacy of the regime or widespread disloyal attitudes towards it are gen-
erated among the marginalized and excluded groups, which perceive themselves 
as ‘subject’ and react reinforcing their ascriptive nature and their internal links. 
Remarkable socio-economic inequalities, as in the well known mechanism of the 
‘relative deprivation’,26 strengthen these feelings and if the ‘regime factors’ are 
impaired by inefficiency and fail in channeling the popular mobilization violent 
rebellion might erupt and escalate to an open revolutionary process.
The hypothesis outlined here is that, despite a very modest level of political 
institutionalization, remarkable levels of socio-economic inequality, and the 
increasing de-legitimization, the regime may have chances of survival if the 
‘regime factors’ work positively. In particular, some organizational channels of-
fered to the political mobilization (a party, the state machinery, the coercive ap-
paratus) may inhibit the conflict or the open rebellion and, in this way, contrib-
ute to stabilize the regime. It follows that, on the contrary, even the momentary 
interruption of these channels removes the inhibitions and the protest, even 
confrontational and rebellious, can mount up to the revolutionary threshold and 
bring about the collapse of the regime. This interpretation opens up new ques-
tions. Why do the non-democratic regimes last, sometimes for so long? Secondly, 
is there a time limit of such duration? Why do these regimes collapse so suddenly 
and get easily crashed, when they seem so ‘robust’?
These questions reveal a paradox. Duration is a stabilizing factor of a demo-
cratic regime, because time settles the actors’ attitudes, forces their behaviors 
in recognizable and predictable patterns, and establishes mutual expectations; 
shortly, time favors the process of institutionalization already described. But the 
opposite applies to the ‘non democracies’, which are more exposed to recurrent 
crises the more they last over time. The ‘non democracies’ may success in fixing 
quickly their initial basis of consensus, or rather strengthening the cohesion of 
the ‘dominant coalition’ supporting the regime,27 because they are able to sup-
ply immediately rewards and distribute privileges to their supporting groups. 
Nonetheless, in the long run they encounter difficulties to regenerating the 
consensus, owing to the rigidity of the political process and to the inhibition of 
the transmission of power. Shortly, they are exposed to failure due to their very 
limited or null level of political institutionalization. Therefore, the frustration 
of the marginalized groups intensify and, should the already recalled organiza-
tional channels of social and political control fail, the ‘non democracies’ become 
exposed to protest and even rebellion. But how long can a ‘non democracy’ last? 
Social sciences do not provide accurate and controllable forecasting models, 
and we can only rely on induction. If the cases of Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria 
26 Tedd Gurr, Why Men Rebel? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).
27 The concept of ‘dominant coalition’ is employed by Leornardo Morlino, Democrazia e democ-
ratizzazioni (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003).
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are taken into account, it could be observed that, with the exclusion Al Sadat in 
Egypt, who held the power only for 11 years before he was killed in 1981 in an at-
tempt organized by the Muslim Brotherhood, the other leaders exercised their 
power for periods ranging between 25 and 40 years. In Tunisia, Bourguiba gov-
erned for 30 years (1957-1987), and his successor Ben Ali for 23 years (1987-2011); 
Gaddafi in Libya held the power for 42 years (1969-2011); Mubarak succeeded Al 
Sadat until 2011, staying in power for 30 years; finally, in Syria Al-Asad governed 
for 29 years (1971-2000), but now his son is facing a tremendous crises. The gener-
ation extension (25-30 years) seems thus the extreme time limit of the duration of 
the autocratic government, after which internal removal, death or assassination 
put an end to the power of the leader. The 25 years ‘threshold generation’ could be 
draw as the limit ad quem of the duration of the non-democratic regimes, beyond 
which they have to address the problem of the transmission of the power and of 
the legitimacy of a new leadership, with no institutional mechanisms for the pur-
pose. The almost certain impossibility for the ‘non democracies’ to transmit the 
power without bloodshed or violent conflict is the most blatant evidence of their 
lack of any institutionalization and the clear sign of their weakness.
It is likewise questionable whether the coercive apparatus is the primary 
instrument of control in the ‘non democracies’. Other ‘regime factors’ or non-
institutional mechanisms are at work, which reduce the means of coercion to 
an ultimate resort. The role of a dominant party in each of the MENA countries 
should not be underestimated and this does partially justice to Huntington’s hy-
pothesis. The party organization, as above argued, can not make up for the deficit 
of institutionalization of the ‘non democracies’, but it serves well the purposes of 
social an political control and above all it provides to the dominant elite an effi-
cient channel for the cooptation of the social groups and sometimes the manage-
ment of the economy.  The party organization worked well as mobilizing channel 
for decades in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria. The Tunisian Constitutional Democratic 
Rally (CDR), the Egyptian National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Baath Party 
in Syria were branched and well-established organizations. They managed in 
those regimes various aspect of the social life, from the access to the state bu-
reaucracy via patronage to the control of market sectors and of the national eco-
nomic system. It would be a mistake to consider the Syrian hereditary succession 
from Al-Asad to his son Bashar as a sign of stability,28 as the subsequent events 
proved, because any transmission of power destabilizes the ‘non democracies’. 
This is also especially true in Syria and Egypt where the army plays a role of social 
and economic relevance, and the selection of the new leaders has been strongly 
conditioned by the military hierarchy.
These ‘regime factors’ (the military, the party organization, and even the state 
bureaucratic apparatus) disguise the real weakness of the ‘non democracies’, which 
28 As it is done by Joshua Stacher (2011), ‘Reinterpreting Authoritarian Power: Syria’s Heredi-
tary Succession, Middle East Journal, 65 (2, 2011), 197-212. 
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is their difficulty to transmit the power. The ‘Arab Spring’ has focused on countries 
that have reached or overtaken the 25 years ‘threshold generation’, and this timing 
is a triggering cause of crisis, because of the lack of any institutional mechanism 
to hand the power and of the rigidity of the political process which has neglected 
large sectors of the society. Some formally democratic traits of these regimes may 
be misleading, but both in Tunisia and Egypt the elections were not free, because 
they excluded the oppositions, while the Parliaments held a symbolic function of 
ratification of the will of the autocrats, both for its position and irrelevance in deci-
sion-making and for the presence of a dominant party. In Tunisia, 20% of the seats 
were formally reserved for the opposition, but the CDR of President Ben Ali as-
sured more than 80%, thanks to an electoral system which attributed to the major-
ity party in each constituency all the available seats. A similar dominant position 
was held in Egypt by the NDP, but the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
2005 elections, when it gained about 20% although forced to present its candidates 
as ‘independent’, was contrasted by the regime resorting to violence in the attempt 
to influence the outcome of voting.29 The breakdown of Libyan regime under 
Gaddafi does not pose the same puzzle. The hegemonic position of Gaddafi’s clan 
and his allies was clear, there were no political elections, because in the structure of 
the Jamahiriya the representatives of the cities, villages and communities flowed 
through the districts in the General People’s Congress, over which, however, act-
ed with absolute dominion the Council of the Revolutionary Guide controlled by 
Gaddafi. Tunisia and Egypt could count on effective administrative systems, while 
the same can not be said in the case of Libya, where the personal connections to the 
dictator and the privileges of the clan membership prevailed. The judiciary was rel-
atively independent in Tunisia and Egypt, though in both cases the regimes tried 
to condition it through the exercise of political pressure, jeopardizing its internal 
promotion system, and regulating accordingly the resources.
According to the RoA’s thesis, coercion is the key factors of the persistence of 
the authoritarian regimes. The police forces were in Tunisia and Egypt effective 
apparatuses of control and repression at the disposal of the ruling parties and the 
governments, while consistence and role of the army varied in the two cases.  The 
Tunisian army consists of about 32,000 units, including the Navy, and was never 
directly involved in war (apart from sending a small contingent in Egypt during 
the war against Israel in 1973). It can be regarded as essentially depoliticized. On 
the contrary, the Egyptian army is numerically very large (almost 900 000 units, 
including the reservists) and holds significant interests in the economic and pro-
ductive sectors. Some Egyptian industries and firms are directly controlled by 
the Ministry of Defense, or by their officials or retired generals who occupy top 
managerial positions. Through the Ministry of Defense, very large sectors of the 
Egyptian economy has been subject to military and state control, so it is not sur-
29 Hendrik Kraetzschmar. and  Francesco Cavatorta, ‘Bullets over Ballots: Islamist Groups, the 
State and Electoral Violence in Egypt and Marocco’, Democratization, 17 (2, 2010), 326-349.
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prising that recent trends towards privatization and market opening have been 
opposed by the military. Moreover, the three leaders of modern Egypt (Nasser, Al 
Sadat and Mubarak) came from the army.
The Libyan army consistency was estimated around 25 000 units among pro-
fessionals and conscripts. It was organized into ‘brigades’ (kata’ib), which had a 
tribal matrix and were also based on the recruitment of foreigners from related 
tribes. Among the ‘social factors’ of the regime, the tribal element was central in 
the Libyan case. It pervaded the administrative structure of the system, while it 
was relatively absent in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt. In Tunisia, the French 
colonial government had already tried to eradicate the tribes and President Bour-
guiba continued this policy forcing some tribes to migrate to Libya. Similarly, in 
Egypt both the action of the colonial government and of Nasser led to the eradica-
tion of the tribal element, although non-negligible differences persist between 
the social classes and between urban and rural notables. In Tunisia and Egypt 
the organizations of the ruling parties replaced the tribal structures or at least 
overlapped them to a point of making them no longer recognizable. Finally, in 
Tunisia and Egypt, unlike Libya, a network of relevant social groups, more or 
less directly linked to the regime, developed. In Tunisia acted two important 
functional groups, such as the central union UGTT (Tunisian Union Générale 
du Travail) which was strongly penetrated by the CDR, and the organization of 
the entrepreneurs UTICA (Tunisian Union de l’Industrie, du Commerce et de 
l’Artisanat) which through the years hardly showed any autonomy and capacity 
of independent action from the regime. The Muslim Brotherhood is active in 
both Tunisia and Egypt, but if in the former case, the appointment of the imams 
by the government has limited its oppositional potential, in Egypt it has acted 
independently through the establishment of NGOs which provide social services 
and assistance, and in this way it has been able to enlarge his support and fol-
lowers especially among the poorer classes. The Muslim Brotherhood emerged 
gradually in Egypt as one of the main opposition groups to the regime,30 and the 
army tried through the years to uproot it by means of repression and political 
prosecution. When the Muslim Brotherhood gradually became penetrated by the 
ultra-conservative wahhabism, it revealed to be an unexpected backing group of 
President Mubarak’s efforts to contain the modernizing trends in society.31
During the early stages of the ‘Arab Spring’, the protest has involved especially 
the younger generations and exhibited a social and economic connotation. The 
economic opportunities offered to the emerging social groups, often urbanized 
youth with higher education, were so unsatisfactory to trigger protests. The 
widespread perception of closure of the regime and its corruption did the rest, 
30 See Gilles Kepel, Le Prophéte et Pharaon. Les movements islamistes dans l’Egypte contemporaine 
(Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1984).
31 This interpretation is advanced by Alaa Al Aswany, On the State of Egypt: What Made the Revo-
lution Inevitable (New York: Vintage, 2011).
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exacerbating the protest and taking it into open rebellion. The Egyptian case is, 
from this point of view, emblematic, because the sum of these factors were al-
ready evident in the pre-revolutionary phase: growing poverty, unemployment, 
corruption, repression, deficiencies in ensuring the basic rights, such as health 
and education, while the regime was primarily concerned to ensure the succes-
sion of the presidency from Hosni Mubarak to his son Gamal.32 
These ‘social factors’ (social and economic discontent, loss of legitimacy, grow-
ing impact of the religious movements) did not manifested suddenly in early 
2010, they must have been incubating for a long time and possibly remained in a 
latent state for decades. As a paradox, the RoA thesis fails to explain the outbreak 
of the ‘social factors’. When coercion is ‘needed’, because the ‘social factors’ finally 
exercise their pressure on the regime, coercion does not suffice to contain protest 
and rebellion and the sudden fall of the ‘idols’ of the regime may be the outcome. 
Were then the Arab authoritarianism really so robust? It seem that the outburst 
of the ‘social factors’ alone can not be the primary cause of the collapse of authori-
tarianism in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. For decades these factors have acted, but the 
regimes were able to cope with the discontent thanks to their organizational ap-
paratuses (the police, the military, the party, a state bureaucracy designed to favor 
the supporting ‘client’ groups). It was an illusory stability and robustness, the re-
gimes did not have any true institutional mechanism to transmit and regenerate 
the power and could survive only as long as the potential ‘social factors’ of insta-
bility and turmoil stayed latent. In Tunisia, the CDR occupied for decades all the 
important political positions within the regime, becoming the permanent and 
pervasive political instrument of recruitment in the administration and in the 
political sphere. The Tunisian army, while not occupying a position as important 
as in the case of Egypt, provided ongoing support to the party and the connection 
between party and army ensured the survival of the regime. In Egypt, the army 
was the main stronghold of the regime, performing a function in many ways sim-
ilar to that of his counterpart in Turkey, while the liberalization of the political 
competition was never effective.33 In Libya, the backbone of the regime appeared 
to be the tribal structure and the network of direct relations with the dictator.
The crisis and eventually the breakdown of the Arab authoritarian regimes 
are to be found in the ‘regime factors’. Nonetheless, it is not easy to detect the fail-
ure of the ‘regime factors’. A possible way out is offered to us by the observation 
of recent events, as a strategy of ex post investigation, arguing that if the ‘regime 
factors’ had some relevance in the stabilization of the authoritarian power for 
decades, it is likely that the current crises bestowed on them their more evident 
effects. This simple investigation strategy seems promising. In Tunisia, between 
the end of 2010 and October 2011, the elections for the Constituent Assembly were 
32 Ibidem.
33 The political reforms in Egypt and their limited impact, see Eberhard Kienle, A Grand Delu-
sion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt (New York: I.B. Tauris & C0. Ldt., 2001).
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held (January 14, 2011), the government was overthrown and President Ben Ali 
fled to Saudi Arabia; in the aftermath the Prime Minister Ghannouchi resigned; 
the political police was dissolved; the CDR was declared illegal and disbanded, 
all its assets were confiscated; the political prisoners were released. The crisis in 
Tunisia invested directly the ‘regime factors’: the single party and its leadership, 
the police forces and its apparatus. This is too much of a striking evidence not to 
infer the conclusion that the authoritarian Tunisian regime was far from being 
‘robust’ and to invalidate the RoA hypothesis. How come that such supposed to 
be ‘robust’ apparatus liquefied once exposed to the very first serious challenge to 
the regime in many years?
Something similar occurred in Egypt in 2011. The protests and the movement 
of Tahrir Square shook the regime and put the armed forces and police in front 
of the dilemma either to repress or tolerate. In February President Mubarak was 
removed and prosecuted as responsible for the victims caused by the recent dis-
orders and the clash between police and protesters. Two appointed prime min-
isters resigned in succession (Nazif and Shafik), and after the suspension of the 
constitution, the military assumed the power. The parliament was dissolved, the 
state security services dismantled, the NDP disbanded and its assets transferred 
to the state. In the Egyptian crises the role of the army was initially neutral, but as 
soon as the breakdown seemed unavoidable, the army took over the power with-
out any attempt to save the exiting regime. Once again, we are facing the same 
puzzle. The ‘robust’ stronghold of the Egyptian authoritarian regime refrained 
from backing it and assumed a rather super partes attitude in the civil and political 
disorders. Finally, in Libya, the total absence of organizational elements backing 
the system, as the party and the army in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, opened 
the field to the direct protest against the dictator and his circle. A conflict or rath-
er a civil war between factions erupted, opposing the army and the forces loyal 
to the regime and Gaddafi in Tripoli and concentrated in some internal regions 
of the country, to the “rebels” moving from Cyrenaica and supported by foreign 
military intervention. The European powers and the U.S., joined under the NATO 
and on the basis of some UN’s resolutions engaged in the battle and legitimized 
the constitution of the National Transitional Council (NTC). The international 
military intervention was decisive in the outcome of the war in favor of the NTC, 
which after the capture and death of Gaddafi was internationally recognized as 
the exclusive authority of government in Libya.
6. Conclusions
Weakly institutionalized regimes react in different ways to the challenge of so-
cial mobilization,34 or to the action of what could be labeled ‘social factors’, ac-
34 Eva Bellin, ‘Reconsidering the RoA in the Middle East’, pp. 135-136, stressed the different 
impact of the process of social mobilization in the Arab world.
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cording to the variable capacity of some ‘regime factors’ to channel and control 
discontent, protest and open rebellion. Not only these ‘regime factors’ may per-
form differently from case to case, but they can be even different in their nature. 
The authoritarian regime of Tunisia had its stronghold in the ruling party and in 
the state apparatus. The CDR and the political police at its disposal were disman-
tled immediately after Bel Ali’s flight. This opening of the political space offered 
new opportunities to the oppositions, with the consequent creation of various 
parties, including the confessional Ennahda and some ‘liberal’ parties (Congress 
of the Republic, the Democratic Forum for Labour and Freedoms). Nonetheless, 
the state apparatus, purged of the presence of representatives of the DRC, main-
tained sufficient degrees of functionality, while the involvement of the army in 
the riots was negligible. The forced exile of Ben Ali and his entourage assumed 
the symbolic value of an epoch-making change. The transition could thus go 
through negotiations between the political forces until the election of a Constit-
uent Assembly, because the ‘regime factors’ were at least partially persistent and 
made up for the complete breakdown of the political ruling elite.
Something similar happened in Egypt, although there the key ‘regime factors’ 
revealed not to be the state apparatus and the party but the military. Indeed, the 
NDP was swept away by the crisis, and Mubarak was ousted on February 11, 2011. 
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, headed by General Tantawi and com-
posed of 20 senior officers, seized the power in a way which almost appeared like 
military coup. It followed a phase characterized by conflict between the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces and the new political forces, and eventually the in-
coming presidential election (23-24 May 2012) was opened to candidacies of the 
oppositions too. Mohamed Morsi (Muslim Brotherhood) was elected with about 
52% of the votes, but immediately the High Court, controlled by the military, 
tried to impinge his action and jeopardize his legitimacy. A heated confronta-
tion resulted. The High Court (June 14, 2012) dissolved the Parliament elected the 
previous winter and dominated for three quarters of the seats by representatives 
of the Islamic formations, but President Morsi annuls by decree the decision of 
the High Court ( July 8) and restores the Parliament in its functions. His action 
was strongly backed in the streets by the movement ‘April, 6’, the Islamic youth 
organization which constituted the backbone of the protests in Tahrir Square. 
While the secular political forces appeared divided, the conflict between the mili-
tary and the Muslim Brotherhood escalated but paradoxically was contained in 
its initial judicial form. President Morsi obtained his first   tangible success on 
August, 12 removing Hussein Tantawi as Chief of the Armed Forces and Minister 
of Defense, and abolishing the constitutional decree of the High Court which on 
June, 17 had deprived him of the title of Supreme Head of the Armed Forces.
The cases of Tunisia and Egypt show the different effects of the ‘regime fac-
tors’ on the transition from the authoritarian regime. In Tunisia, the dissolution 
of the CDR, the sudden elimination of its power network, the flight of Ben Ali 
and the neutrality of the armed forces opened the competitive space to various 
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political parties, without exception, supporting the launch of a constituent pro-
cess. In Egypt, after the party which offered a political façade to the military rule 
was swept away, the power of the army remained effective, also because of its 
roots in the civil society and in the economic system. The army tried to preserve 
its role and influence during the transition phase and after the election of Morsi. 
Although it is hard to forecast the outcome of the current confrontation between 
the persistent ‘regime factor’ (the Army) and the political forces emerged from 
the crisis, Egypt is bound to go through a long phase of instability and such a ‘fac-
tor’ is going to exercise its conditioning action on the dynamics of democratiza-
tion. Egypt, in other words, is caught between Scylla and Charybdis, between the 
possible evolution towards a political model which might resemble nowadays 
Turkey, and the danger of a sudden outburst of violence which would heavily in-
volve the army, similarly to Syria at the present time. Compared to the two cases 
of Tunisia and Egypt, that of Libya is less linear. The outcome of the civil war was 
the overthrow of Gaddafi’s personalistic regime, but at the same time the tribal 
original structure of the Libyan community appeared again in all its strength. 
Gaddafi failed in shaping Libya as a national community and the Jamahiriya was 
only a political façade to cover the tribal structure of the regime and the pattern 
of political exchange between the dictator and some privileged groups. It is thus 
unclear to what extent the NTC will be able to establish itself as a reference to 
Libyan political community as a whole. Altogether, Libya is left with the memory 
of its ‘fallen idol’ and a landscape of political ruins.
The weakening of the ‘regime factors’ is thus essential to interpret the recent 
pushes towards democracy in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. As long as these factors 
retain their effectiveness, the emergence of a social crisis, such as the loss of le-
gitimacy of the regime, or the change of cultural orientations, or the growing 
social and economic inequality, can be controlled through the channels of po-
litical mobilization and organization available to the regime (a single party, the 
tribal structure, the bureaucracy, the apparatus of repression). As a paradox, and 
as previously argued, the duration of these regimes is not necessarily an indica-
tor of their stability or ‘robustness’. The longer is the persistence of any closed re-
gime, which is a regime characterized by unlikelihood of the transmission of the 
power and rigidity of the political process, the closer it is to its terminus ad quem. 
At that point, because such regimes lack any institutional mechanism for the 
effective regeneration of their ruling class and the transmission of power, they 
enter into a spiral of political instability; unavoidably their worshipped leaders 
become ‘fallen idols’ and then the regime faces the risk of a sudden collapse.
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